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ABSTRACT 
 
Perceptions of Threat in the 21st Century 
 
Harry Stewart, B.S., Appalachian State University 
 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
Chairperson: Renee Scherlen 
 
 
 
      The goal of this work is to explain the US’s continued disregard for the threat of low-tech 
attacks like those of 9/11.  This work shows that misperceptions of threat within the US have 
led to an inability to adapt to the changing nature of warfare in the 21st century.  This is done 
by examining data found in the Global Terrorism Database as well as defense spending, 
which supports the hypothesis that the US places more emphasis on high-tech threats even 
though low-tech threats are more deadly in terrorist attacks.  This work shows that existing 
perceptions of threat and security within the US are outdated and ineffective, and that new 
norms of threat perception are needed.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
     Defense spending is an important issue in the United States.  A severe economic decline 
as well as two foreign wars and a continued terrorist threat all serve to make the large sums 
earmarked for defense a controversial topic.  When the defense budgets are examined, there 
is a clear emphasis placed on defense against conventional threats to the country; big weapon 
systems and anti-ballistic missile defense systems dominate the budget (Trajtenberg).  
However, the only attacks on US soil since World War II occurred as a result of terrorist 
action, not an action by a state with a conventional military or ballistic missiles.  Even the 
literature on terrorist threats to the US is replete with warnings of nuclear, biological, 
chemical, and other high-tech threats; yet the most successful and deadly terrorist attack 
against the US was carried out by a handful of individual with box-cutters (Global Terrorism 
Database).  What is to account for the US’s inability to adapt to this new form of threat? 
Why, in face of overwhelming precedent, does the US continue to fight the wars of the past?  
A review of relevant literature in the field, while yielding pertinent information, reveals a 
lack of empirical analysis of this issue.  The purpose of this work is to fill that gap, and 
provide an empirical and reasoned analysis of the constructed nature of US defense policy.  
My hypothesis is that the US, due to a technocentric perception of threat, deems high-tech 
threats of greater importance than low-tech threats.  Further, this perception of threat is 
institutionalized by the static nature of defense budgeting, which is focused on high-tech
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conventional threats to national security despite the recent trend of terrorist actions 
against the US and threats to individual security.  The null hypothesis is that high-tech 
threats are in fact more of a threat to the US, in which case current paradigms in spending 
are justified.   
      This work begins by outlining and defining key concepts and terms.  This chapter 
provides valuable background information as well as illustrates the need for statistical 
analysis within the body of literature.  The next chapter consists of an overview of current 
US paradigms of spending, threat, technology, and realism.  A quantitative analysis of 
terrorist threat follows.  This threat analysis explores whether or not there is a valid 
challenge to the established constructed defense policy mindset:  Is there a dichotomy 
between the types of threat that the U.S. claims to face and the types of threat that the 
U.S. has actually encountered?  Does the U.S. emphasize some forms of threat more than 
others?  Does the rhetoric of defense match defense spending? Do rhetoric and spending 
compliment actual threats encountered?  The final section presents the conclusion 
reached from the statistical findings and argues that (1) the rhetoric of the US government 
and the spending of the government are at odds with the threats met and (2) the origin of 
the contradictions between genuine threats and funded programs arise from the 
entrenched nature of US ideology and neo-realist paradigms.  The thesis advocates an 
alternative approach to defense policy that better reflects the realities of insecurity and 
threat in the 21st century.  Such an alternative approach would more accurately assess the 
threats of today and tomorrow. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Key Concepts and Terms 
     Before analyzing funding and threats, a brief overview of essential concepts and terms is 
needed.  The dominant paradigms are discussed; additionally terms employed by both the US 
government and this work are clarified.  This sets a stage for the arguments presented.  
Furthermore, this provides context for the empirical data and findings, as well as frames the 
normative conclusion of the work. 
Realism 
         Currently, the dominant paradigm guiding foreign policy analysis is realism.  Given the 
dominance of realism, it is crucial to articulate its main elements.  Realist thinkers and policy 
makers have long held to the belief that the anarchic state of the international system as well 
as the barbarous actions that anarchy forces on states is natural and unimpeachable.  It is this 
state that causes nations to cement a vision of security, and threats to that security, into their 
psyche. 
     The idea of an international system structured through anarchy, in which power ensures 
survival, forms the basis of realist thought and can provide insight to the nature of US views 
of security and threat.  Notable scholars among realist thinkers include Waltz, Walt, Greico, 
and Mearsheimer; the works of these authors have come to define international politics for 
many in politics.  Those who work in think tanks and serve as advisors typically draw upon 
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the main tenants of realist theories.  For instance, Waltz’s “The Anarchic Structure and 
World Politics” is a look into the anarchic nature of the international system, and defines 
anarchy as a system, in which unitary actors play to their best advantage in a zero-sum 
format.  Walt extends and adds detail to this idea in his “Alliances: Balancing and 
Bandwagoning.”  As the title suggests, this work explains the need for balancing or 
bandwagoning when a state is faced with a threat, and how balancing accrues a higher 
standing for a state, making it preferable when considering relative gains among allies.  
Greico defines the issue of gains in “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation” (2003); he 
states that realism more clearly represents the international system because of the relative 
gains format of that system.  Key to Greico’s argument is the idea that gains for one actor 
are losses for another in the dog eat dog world of international politics.  Greico’s disdain 
for the atomistic actors of liberalism prompts him to state the importance of relative gains 
in the international system, as an ally one year may be next year’s enemy.         
US Foreign Policy 
     There have been many great works regarding the role of Ideology in US foreign 
policy.  William Appleman Williams wrote what many consider to be the greatest work 
on the topic, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.  His work focuses on the history of 
foreign policy within the United States, and the key role that ideology played in it.  First, 
there is the ideology associated with notions of American exceptionalism.  Second, there 
is the capitalist ideology that motivates government action.  In Williams’s opinion, the 
belief that the US has been a anti-imperialist state are misguided at best.  According to 
Williams, from the Monroe Doctrine onward, the US has geared its foreign policy 
process to enlarging its economic capabilities in a realist zero-sum type format, in effect 
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building an empire.  Williams also argued that the altruistic endeavors carried out by the 
United States were little more than veneers to expand existing markets or open new ones; 
in short expanding democracy went conspicuously hand in hand with exporting US 
goods.   
     Michael Hunt’s work Ideology and US Foreign Policy sees US ideology as the 
primary motivator of US policy abroad.  Ideology, which Hunt defines as “an interrelated 
set of convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of 
reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that 
reality” is his key to understanding US actions (xi). Hunt’s definition is the one which 
this work bases any discussion of ideology on.  Hunt takes an in-depth and historical 
approach to examining US policy.  Hunt believes that the US has a nationalist idea of 
greatness, which must be continually stressed and supported through its foreign policy; 
that the US has a strict hegemony of races that shaped its perceptions of the abilities and 
intentions of others; and the US has an almost phobic aversion to social revolutions 
abroad.  Hunt believes these three norms in the elites of the United States government 
have, and continue to, shape its foreign policy.   
     William Walker’s work National Security and Core Values in American History is 
similar to the work of Williams and Hunt, in that he synthesizes the dual motivations of 
economic expansion and ideology into what he describes as American core values.  
Walker states that “this book asks whether the demands of national security undermine 
the integrity of liberty and weaken, perhaps irreparably, the values associated with it” 
(ix).  While engaging in wonderfully detailed analysis, Walker also attempts to add a 
normative component to the work.  While many other authors have attempted similar 
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normative speculation on US foreign policy, Walker’s use of Williams’ models as well as 
others, in combination with the contemporary nature of the work, (first published in 2009, 
Walker’s book includes many of the issues so critical to the US foreign policy today) 
makes his view ideal for the timeline of this work.  Walker quoted Charles Beard in his 
conclusion, “The Supreme interest of the United States is the creation and maintenance of 
a high standard of life for all its people and the ways of industry conducive to the 
promotion of individual and social virtues within the frame of national security” (293).  
While Walker condemns US foreign policy for the same reasons as Beard, (and for the 
same reasons that inspired such fear in Williams) he makes a compelling case for the 
intrinsic nature of those policy decisions, that the core values of the United States are so 
ingrained that to divorce them from US policy would be impossible.   
     The realist interpretation of policy within Washington focuses on the all-
encompassing need of states to engage in self-perpetuating foreign policy, policy than 
ensures security, and puts all other concerns second.  This realist bent to US foreign 
policy plays an important role to the ideas of threat and security which form the US’s 
perspective in international relations.  This role will be examined and critiqued later in 
the work.       
Human Security 
      This realist concern with national security, which has been inviolate for so long, has 
recently come under fire as innovations in communication and technology have allowed 
an unfiltered look into the daily lives of individuals.  This shift, which is in and of itself 
worthy of long discussion elsewhere, makes a cornerstone of the argument of this work.  
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Many people have become dissatisfied with the status quo idea of security when 
confronted with security issues of a different kind; rape, famine, climate change, ethnic 
conflict, intra-state warfare, and human rights (or their lack), are all security issues which 
realism has no place for.  They are, however, becoming more and more apparent to the 
citizens of the world as states are no longer able confine the world to simple ideas of “us” 
and “them.”  This has prompted a call for a new idea of security, one in which the 
individual rather than the state is the focus.  This new security, called collective security 
or human security holds the key to many of the problems facing the world today, and 
possibly the answer to the questions posed by this work 
     An important shift in the concept of security occurred in 1994 with United Nations 
Human Development Report (UNHDR).  This report “introduces a new concept of 
human security, which equates security with people rather than territories, with 
development rather than arms. It examines both the national and the global concerns of 
human security.”  The report focuses on six main characteristics of human security; 
• Investing in human development, not in arms; 
• Engaging policy makers to address the emerging peace dividend; 
• Giving the United Nations a clear mandate to promote and sustain development; 
• Enlarging the concept of development cooperation so that it includes all flows, 
not just aid; 
• Agreeing that 20% of national budgets and 20% of foreign aid be used for human 
development; and 
• Establishing an Economic Security Council.   
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This shift from established views of state security is ideal when viewing the security 
threat posed by terrorism.   
     A 2005 UN panel on collective security is also useful in seeing the new perspective of 
security in the world.  Anne-Marie Slaughter in her article “Security, Solidarity, and 
Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform” seeks to outline this lengthy panel and 
provides interesting insight into the new theme of collective security.  “The panel focuses 
equally on the military and nonmilitary dimensions of collective security, turning first to 
the ‘challenge of prevention,’ then to the use of force…the high-level panel offers an 
blueprint for profound change, through nothing less than a reconceptualization of 
security, solidarity, and even sovereignty” (619).  It states that state security should be 
subordinate to human security, a profound shift from previous thoughts on this topic.  It 
also seeks to redefine solidarity, encouraging a feeling of community between human 
beings rather than citizens of specific nations or states.  The redefinition of sovereignty 
may be the most controversial of all, as it seeks to make states responsible to the 
international community for the safety and wellbeing of their citizens.  The foundation of 
the report, and of collective security, states Slaughter, is “Collective Security means 
Collective Responsibility” (631). 
     There has also been recent inquiry into the impact of a lack of human security on 
promoting terrorism.  Rhonda Callaway and Julie Harrelson-Stephens sought to explore 
the relationship between human rights conditions and terrorist activity in their article 
“Toward a Theory of Terrorism: Human Security as a determinate of Terrorism.”  They 
found that “it is the denial of security rights that is the necessary condition for terrorism” 
(679).  Their case study of Northern Ireland argues that state violations of civil, political 
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and security rights lead to conditions in which terrorism is likely.  Out of the three, they 
found that state violations of security rights, specifically through state sponsored 
terrorism, are the most necessary for the creation of terrorism. The authors state that “it is 
only when the government engages in state terror that the appeal of terrorism moves 
toward wide spread support” (698). 
     Another vital work is New and Old Wars by Mary Kaldor.  Kaldor sought to examine 
the conflict in Bosnia as a critical case of what she terms “new war.”  New war, as 
opposed to old war (conventional conflicts such as WWII), is one that has evolved since 
the end of the Cold War and is strongly influenced by identity politics.  Identity politics, 
by which Kaldor means “the claim to power on the basis of a particular identity – be it 
national, clan, religious, or linguistic”  are central to the concept of new war, and replace 
many of the former realist notions of power that have formed the locus of conflict in the 
past  (7).  These new wars are often low-intensity conflicts that more resemble guerilla 
warfare or terrorism that the traditional conflicts of the past.  This is an important facet of 
the reconceptualization of threat and security that this work is attempting to prove 
necessary.  As the US and its allies find themselves involved in more and more “new 
wars,” the outdated methods of security which focus on conventional forms of threat that 
were so prominent in the Cold War will become more and more ineffective, and in fact 
come to hinder security in the US rather than ensure it.   
Constructivism 
     A key part of the argument in this work is that the way in which the US views threat 
and security is in large part constructed from the recent Cold War, and not so recent 
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World Wars.  The foundation of this reasoning is well established; many notable authors 
have sought to examine what political elites have long held inherent or natural to the 
world of international politics.  What is lacking is an application of this reasoning to 
current US defense policy, specifically in regard to the War on Terror and this new era of 
warfare.  To this end, a brief overview of seminal constructivist thinkers will aid in this 
endeavor.   
     Alexander Wendt explains the way in which many of our ideas about international 
politics are formed.  His work Social Theory of International Politics (1999) offers a 
basis for constructivist theory.  Wendt states that everything we do or think in regards to 
international politics is a result of ideas.  Ideas such as power, identity, and interest are all 
important parts of the international system.  These ideas then coalesce into structures, 
which Wendt calls a codified set of beliefs.  Wendt believes that individual’s beliefs are 
codified by the state into structures, which then form the basis for state identity.  Those 
states then act in the international system according to that identity.  This forms the basis 
for Wendt’s article Anarchy is What States Make of It. This article is Wendt’s theory 
applied to the international structure of anarchy.  Wendt states that “A fundamental 
principal of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other 
actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.”  When applied to 
anarchy, this statement suggests that actors react based on preconceived notions and 
identities, rather than the absolute truths which most believe to be an inherent part of the 
system.  Wendt quotes Peter Berger and Thomas Lickmann’s definition of reification as 
important in our understanding of constructivist theory; “[It] is the apprehension of the 
products of human activity as if they were something else than human products-such as 
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facts of nature, results of cosmic laws or manifestations of divine will.  Reification 
implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world, and 
further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his products are lost to 
consciousness” (Wendt 79).  It is this idea that man cannot see his own part in the 
creation of anarchy and its identity that Wendt argues forms the basis of the way man 
reacts to anarchy.  
     These constructivist ideas are also seen in Katzenstein’s work The Culture of National 
Security (1996) which, as the title suggests, takes a constructivist look at the way in 
which nations define their security.  Katzenstein suggests that interests are constructed 
through interaction, and that following the end of the Cold War, issues dealing with 
norms, identities and cultures are becoming more salient, while traditional Cold War 
notions of security are becoming less so.  Katzenstein states that the new issues deal with 
ethnic conflict, civil wars, economic competitiveness, and will become more important as 
the years go on.  He also states that the failure of realists and liberals alike to predict or 
explain the peaceful end of the Cold War show how traditional notions and assumptions 
of security during the Cold War are outdated and in need of revision (524). 
    Katzenstein along with Ronald Jepperson and Alexander Wendt in the article “Norms, 
Identity, and Culture in National Security” argues that “the security environments in 
which states are embedded are an important part cultural and institutional, rather than just 
material…[and] cultural environments affect not only the incentives for different kinds of 
state behavior but also the basic character of states-what we call state ‘identity’”  
(Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 33).  This, the authors continue, is the basis of the 
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contention constructivists have with both neo-liberals and neo-realists, who believe that 
actor properties are essential to the actors, rather than contingent upon them.   
      In the past, the US has perceived and responded to threats to security from a realist 
perspective with reliance on traditional military responses.  Recently, a new trend has 
arisen in which those traditional views of threat and security have been challenged.  
Human security presents an alternative approach to security perception, while 
constructivist thought allows an alternative approach to mainstream realist policy.  This 
work makes use of constructivist theory to emancipate policy from the bonds of realism, 
and allow for an individual focused perception of security which is better able to combat 
the threats of the 21st century.  To do this a rigorous quantitative examination of threat 
will be used to identify the practical nature of conflict today.  These factors combined 
will create a new and innovative picture of threat and security today. 
21st Century Conflict 
     Recently scholars and some few policy makers around the world have recognized the 
limitations of traditional power politics and sought a new theory with which to help 
understand and interpret the unique challenges of the 21st century.  Mary Kaldor again 
makes an appearance as she seeks to understand the way in which conflict has evolved 
since the end of the Cold War.  Kaldor conducted a case study on the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina during the mid-nineties.  She uses this case because of the unique 
circumstances involved.  While this war shared many of the characteristics of others that 
have taken place since the end of the Cold War, it is exceptional in that it captured the 
attention of the whole world, which helps the author in making her case of 
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cosmopolitanism.  The atypical nature of the war up to that point made it a crucial and 
deviant case.  Yet, as we have observed of the wars since then, particularly in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the cosmopolitan attention received by the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has 
since become prototypical as the world community exhibits increasing involvement in 
new wars. 
           Kaldor believes there is a clash between the new war reality and the old war 
mentality of government officials.  She believes that wars will continue to be those of the 
new war style, and that further research into old war style weapons and tactics will be 
fruitless in the post-modern era of warfare.  Kaldor believes that these new wars are 
arising from the erosion of the autonomy of the state, which in turn leads to an erosion of 
the monopoly of organized violence by the state (2007). 
        These new wars are different from the conventional modern war by their goals, 
methods of making war, and how they are financed.  The goals are those of identity 
politics rather than the geo-political or ideological goals of old wars.  The methods of 
new wars are those of guerilla war and counterinsurgency.    No longer are wars a series 
of decisive battles to control an area, territory is now captured and maintained by political 
means.  Large battles are avoided, and winning hearts and minds is the true measure of 
victory.  Kaldor states that another key factor of new war methods are the casualty 
figures; she says that in modern wars “the ratio of military to civilian casualties was 8:1”  
new wars have reversed that trend, with “a ratio of military to civilian casualties 
approximately 1:8”  (9).  Organization has also affected methods, as there is a decline in 
the typical hierarchical military structures of old wars, replaced by a horizontal system of 
warlords, mercenaries, police forces, criminals, and regular armies.   
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          Kaldor believes that this new understanding of war will allow for a successful way 
of combating it; that to fight the guerilla tactics and terrorism often found in new wars, a 
new cosmopolitan approach is required.  Cosmopolitanism is, as Kaldor confesses, 
somewhat of a utopian ideal.  She believes that the international community, working in 
harmony and under an aegis of legitimacy, is the only way that new wars can be 
successfully fought.  This is to mean that unilateral action by any country is doomed to 
fail.  Terrorism particularly is susceptible to this approach, in Kaldor’s view, as it feeds of 
the disadvantaged and alienated people of the global community. Kaldor states that the 
international community, “implying a cohesive group of governments acting through 
international organizations, entered into everyday usage” is the new agent that must 
combat these threats (119).  Kaldor continues, saying that the key to combating the 
violence of new wars is to reconstruct legitimacy, both of the governments themselves, 
and the international community’s involvement in the conflicts.  What this means is that 
intervention by the international community must be altruistic, by focusing on the 
protection of human rights, and punishing those who violate them.  Any sort of gain on 
the side of the international community could be seen to de-legitimize their endeavors. 
     Kaldor states that her main goal in defining the differences between old and new wars 
is to “change the prevailing perceptions of war, especially among policy makers” (3).  
She states that a new sense of cosmopolitanism is the answer to the new war problem, 
rather than reliance on traditional or conventional unilateral attitudes towards warfare.  
Kaldor gives the example of the Revolution in Military Affairs, which is an ongoing 
project by the US to un-man war and increase its precision and lethality.  The goal is to 
keep US causalities to a minimum while using information technology as well as 
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precision weapons to attack targets and minimizing collateral damage.  This Revolution 
in Military Affairs has been a resounding failure in dealing with the insurgencies in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  High-tech weapons and satellite technology have done little to end 
a conflict that is political in nature.  While Kaldor is one among many who seeks to 
correct the failed policies of old war thinkers, her contribution stands out due to its clear 
findings of a demarcation between old wars and new.  
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CHAPTER 3 
US Spending 
    Spending regimes in the US have been extensively examined.  I believe spending holds the 
key to understanding both goals and motives.  Manuel Trajtenberg, in his work Defense R&D 
in the Anti-Terrorist Era, gives a model of spending which helps simplify the vast amounts 
of money which the US spends on defense.   Trajtenberg points to the staggering disparity in 
spending between the US and the next five countries in terms of defense R&D budgeting.  As 
Table 1 shows, the US spends over ten times the amount of the next closest country, which 
happens to be an ally (Trajtenberg 12). 
 
 
 
Table 1 Defense R&D Stocks for G8 Countries  
Defense R&D stock as of 2000 15% Depreciation 5% Depreciation 
USA 197.23 301.64 
United Kingdom 18.21 28.03 
France 17.81 28.69 
Japan 9.96 14.78 
Germany 9.18 13.47 
Russia 7.14 11.06 
 
(In billions of constant 1998 $ US) 
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Trajtenberg also finds that the bulk of US funding in the area goes to what he terms big 
weapon systems.  Table 2 reveals the main categories of defense spending.  Notably, a 
relatively small amount of funding goes towards intelligence and anti-terrorism.   It is 
important to note that the apportionment of funding did not drastically change as a result 
of 9/11.  This shows how even in the event of changing threats, budgeting remains static. 
     Spending regimes are typified by the case of Iraq.  Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Blimes’ 
work The Three Trillion Dollar War chronicles the spending and consequences of the 
US’s war in Iraq.  The war in Iraq in 2008 has exceeded in price the twelve year war in 
Vietnam and is double the cost of the war in Korea.  In addition to strict monetary costs, 
one must also consider the more abstract costs of political capitol the US has accrued 
since the war began.  Stiglitz and Blimes write that “the United States is viewed as the 
greatest threat to global peace - even greater than Iran and North Korea.”  (5). While 
political capitol abroad is undoubtedly important, it is monetary costs documented by 
Stiglitz and Blimes that are of interest here.  As their work shows us, spending is 
increasing, even as the scale of US wars decreases.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Distribution of Defense R&D 2001-2003 (%) 
 
Category FY 2001 FY 2002 
FY 
2003 
Big Weapon Systems 30.40% 28.81% 30.59% 
Miscellaneous 34.23% 33.93% 31.93% 
Ballistic Missile Defense 12.61% 17.03% 15.18% 
Intelligence 8.35% 8.17% 9.95% 
Anti-Terrorism 2.13% 8.18% 3.09% 
Not Classified 12.72% 9.87% 9.26% 
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     This attitude to spending can also be seen in the way spending regimes reflect foreign 
policy.  John Mearsheimer’s work makes for a good jump off point into realist 
perspectives in this area of US policy.  Mearsheimer’s work “Why We Will Soon Miss 
the Cold War” focuses on the stability of the bi-polar Cold War system, and how with the 
loss of that structure the world will find itself in an increasingly unstable and anarchic 
situation.  Terrorism and revolution have been sweeping the Middle East, and tension 
between rivals has escalated (Japan-North Korea; Pakistan-India, and possibly US-
China).   The result of this, according to Mearsheimer, will be a situation in which 
relative security will decrease, leading to more conflict (1990). 
     While Mearsheimer argued that instability and war would become, if not 
commonplace, at least more prevalent, Jean-Paul Azam and Veronique Thelen offer an 
interesting alternative to the great power use of military force against periphery countries.  
Azam and Thelen’s work “Foreign Aid Versus Military Intervention in the War on 
Terror” follows the use of aid or, conversely, military action in the War of Terror.  What 
the authors found through quantitative analysis is that direct investment through foreign 
aid reduces the number of terrorist attacks from recipient countries, while direct military 
intervention increases terrorist attacks.  There are caveats for these findings, such as how 
that foreign aid is invested (foreign aid invested into education and counter-terrorism by 
the recipient country has the greatest terrorist threat reducing power) and the nature and 
goals of a military intervention (2010).  This offers a counter argument to the traditional 
realist disregard for soft power and its use in promoting security. 
     In light of the findings of Azam and Thelen, two articles make a compelling case for 
the distribution of US aid funding; “Which Autocracies Get More Foreign Aid?” and 
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“Changing Aid Regimes” by Galymzhan Kirbassov and Robert Fleck and Christopher 
Kilby, respectively.  Kirbassov argues that the US uses its foreign aid allocations to 
promote stability among strategic allies, without regard to other factors.  This focus on 
Huntington-esque stability allows the US to maintain relations (and alliances) with stable 
governments, keeping policies and situations static and more manageable than the fluid 
and dynamic policies that would be essential in the event of a revolutionary movement.  
Modern Middle-East revolutions show the efficacy of this argument, especially that of 
Egypt, a long time US ally but in the grips of a pro-democracy movement that toppled the 
US backed regime. This could also be an even greater concern should a pro-democracy 
movement arise in Saudi Arabia.  This then brings the Fleck and Kilby article into a 
better light.  Fleck and Kilby argue that aid regimes in the War on Terror have resulted in 
a drop in aid to countries that have the greatest need, in favor of countries that have 
become allies or potential allies in the War on Terror.  Fleck and Kirby’s time series 
analysis encompasses the past thirty five years of US foreign aid, and paints a useful 
picture as to the main concerns of the US in this age of terror 
Types of Threat 
     During the Cold War, the world held its breath as the two superpowers and their allies 
squared off in preparation for what many assumed was inevitable conflict.  A 
metaphorical clock was created, which acted as a timer until the doomsday that would 
occur should these two titans ever clash.  However, counter to the predictions of many, 
the Cold War ended without direct bloodshed between the two superpowers.  Afterwords, 
the US stood alone as the sole super power in the world, prompting a slew of predictions 
for this unprecedented phenomenon.  Scholars predicted every possible outcome from an 
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end of history to a clash of civilizations.  But the truth has been somewhat less clear than 
scholars have predicted.  Threats to great nations today come not in the form of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles or mechanized divisions, but in small groups of 
motivated individuals, often times fighting with nothing more than rifles, blades, and 
homemade explosives.  Even the US, with its superpower status, is not immune.  The 
events of 9/11 rocked the world, as the greatest military power in the world was humbled 
by an organization operating out of barely habitable camps in the insignificant country of 
Afghanistan.  How is it possible that a country that spent over 300 billion dollars on 
defense could be attacked so successfully and with such surprise?  The answer lies in the 
way the US identifies and prepares for threat.  The US defense spending, according to 
Trajtenberg, follows “…the logic of the cold war, of the arms race…” (6)  This left the 
US ill prepared to deal with the emerging threats of the new millennium.  Trajtenberg 
finds that the bulk of US funding in the area goes to what he terms big weapon systems.   
These weapon systems include jet fighters, bombers, aircraft carriers, missiles, and 
submarines.  (6)    Other programs also take up significant resources as well.  Notable in 
his research is the relatively small amount of funding that goes towards intelligence and 
anti-terrorism, which were only 11% in 2011.   
     To simply refer to “terrorism” is somewhat of an oversimplification.  Terrorism can 
come in as many forms as conventional threats can.  Many authors focus on the various 
high-tech and highly destructive possible forms of terrorist attack.  Nuclear, biological, 
chemical, and radiological attacks have, due the incredibly high potential casualties they 
could inflict, been the focus of many scholars.  However, as O’Niel has shown, the threat 
may not be as real as many suspect.  Jackson and Frelinger’s work does an admirable job 
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of differentiating and categorizing the different methods of attack.    Jackson and 
Frelinger used similar methods to those found in this work.  They analyze terrorist 
weapon capabilities based on technology as well as by their flexibility and 
appropriateness for different targets (25).  Similar to my own findings, they have shown 
that terrorist more often use lower-tech weapons, mainly because of the versatility of 
those weapons.  This is telling as the results were similar, though from to different source 
databases    In addition to the versatility of these low tech weapons are their relative 
abundance, especially when compared to the more complex and expensive high-tech 
weaponry.  In light of this, it should be clear that the vast majority of terrorist attacks that 
occur are those which use low-tech weaponry (98,000, according to the GTDB, as 
opposed to 95 high-tech attacks).  With these numbers in mind, one must consider the 
current dichotomy of terrorist threats to the US, and how that dichotomy arose. 
Dichotomy of Perception 
     Now that the various threats to the US have been examined, the next step is to 
understand how the US views threat.  Wendt states that “A fundamental principal of 
constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors, on 
the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them”  (79).  What the US has failed to 
do is adapt their meanings based on changes within the world system; they focus only on 
preconceived notions and identities, while ignoring the constantly evolving and dynamic 
nature of the world.  The concept of reification is crucial to this idea.  US policy makers 
have become so enamored with the status quo that they are, so far, incapable of seeing 
their own hand within that status quo, and treat it as if it were an inviolable and inherent 
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part of the system.  Constructivists would argue that the status quo is present and 
consistent only because of the constant efforts of those same leaders in supporting it.   
     The threats against which the US currently guards itself are no longer the most likely 
to occur.  Terrorism, or as Kaldor put it, new war, is now the method with which conflicts 
are carried out.  It is unreasonable to imagine a carrier fleet from China escorting 
thousands of troopships to the shore of California to invade, and while the threat of 
nuclear terrorism is possible, the threat of low-tech terror is present and proven.   
      Katzenstein suggests that interests are constructed through interaction, and that 
following the end of the Cold War, issues dealing with norms, identities, and cultures are 
becoming more salient, while traditional Cold War notions of security are becoming less 
so (Katzenstein 1996).  However, this saliency has been in large part ignored by US 
policy makers, due to the static and unresponsive nature of US policymakers themselves.  
These actors’ ideas are based on notions of identity and ideology that form the marrow of 
the US worldview.  The constructed identity and ideology are based on “an interrelated 
set of convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of 
reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that 
reality” (xi). While reducing a frightening and complex world to easily manageable 
pieces seems attractive in a limited sense, it breeds an unresponsive and stagnant policy 
set that hinders rather than helps.  US policy makers have rendered down the complex 
and dynamic international system into a structured anarchy which, while it may have 
been relevant or even innovative at one point, is past the point of usefulness.   
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     Realists have long held that anarchy is inherent in the international system, and that 
survival in that system requires an almost chess like series of action and response to 
ensure survival.  Maximization of relative power ensures security, allowing states to 
perpetuate themselves.  This idea, which is espoused by many noteworthy scholars 
including Waltz, Mearsheimer, Walt, and Jervis, is no longer able to cope with the 
vagaries of new war and an expanding view of security. While this has been the realist 
identity which the US, as well as many other countries, has set for itself over the years, 
the problem arises when it no longer is seen as a mantle that can be removed or adapted 
when appropriate, but as an epidermis that is organic to the state itself.  
     Terrorism has been a threat for years, yet was largely overlooked as a true threat to US 
security by policy makers prior to the events of 9/11.   If there is something that the US 
can learn from that tragedy, it is that it cannot ever assume that it knows what its enemies 
are thinking.  US policy makers must constantly adapt their notions of threat to 
encompass the changing nature of conflict.  It is a common axiom in the military that 
commanders always prepare to fight the previous war; this resulted in defeat for the 
French in WWII, for the US in Vietnam, for the Soviets in Afghanistan, and likely for the 
US in Iraq and Afghanistan as well.  The US needs to embrace an adaptive and 
responsive foreign policy that takes into account the evolving nature of the international 
system, and at the same time adjust its response set to one that best insures security based 
on the nature of the threat.  As the old saying goes, when your only tool is a hammer, 
every problem looks like a nail.  This begins to get at the reason why Constructivism will 
play such a crucial role in future studies of international relations;  the constructivists are 
the only ones asking if the hammer the US is currently holding is really the best tool for 
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the task.  What is needed is to, if not get rid of the hammers, at least reduce the number 
(and the percent of the budget that is reserved for them) and bring in a more versatile set 
of tools and the people with the knowledge to use them.    
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CHAPTER 4 
Empirical Analysis 
     This chapter will examine the data of terror attacks within the Global Terrorism Database.   
This is done by using the existing tables on defense spending discussed in the previous 
chapter showing the allocation of funding, with analysis of trends in the efficacy of various 
forms of attack.  The work hypothesizes that US spending on defense does not accurately 
represent the threats the US faces in the 21st century, in that the attacks which inflict the most 
casualties are not those to which the US is preparing itself to face.   
Methods 
     The goal of the quantitative portion of this work was to analyze the data found in the 
Global Terrorism Database to explore the relationship between security and threat in the 
post-Cold War era.  The US defense R&D budget (both the total spent and the allocation of 
spending) is used as a proxy for how the US identifies threat.  R&D was used rather than 
annual budgeting because annual budgets fluctuate more than long-term investments in 
R&D, making them more prone to vagaries of limited public opinion and short-term changes 
in policy.  R&D on the other hand reflects the long term goals of the nation with regard to 
defense, and therefore better illustrates overall paradigms.   Other variables are 
operationalized using both the Global Terrorism Database and my own coding which will be 
explained in the data section of the work.   
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Data 
     Most variables used in this work can be found in the codebook for the Global 
Terrorism Database, as well as operationalization of those variables.  Those that were 
created specifically for this work will be defined as they are presented.  This database 
was chosen for a couple of reasons; first, it was the largest collection of data on the 
subject of terrorism to date with over 98,000 cases from 1970 to 2008.  Second, it used 
clear and logical variables without ideological bias, allowing for rigorous testing.        
     The variables used without alteration from the GTDB were a dummy variable for 
success, weapon type, and casualties inflicted in the attack. The variable for success 
requires some explanation of the coding.  The GTDB describes success not as 
achievement of the political goals of the attack, but that the attack itself was carried out 
successfully.  For example, a car bomb in Iraq meant to dissuade US troop presence may 
be considered a success if detonated, even though the US maintained a troop presence 
after the explosion.  Weapon type is coded as the type of weapon or weapons used in the 
attack.  The casualties’ variable is simply the number of casualties that occur from an 
attack, including the perpetrator.  All of these variables and their coding are explained in 
greater detail in the GTDB.   
     In addition to the variables found within the GTDB, some variables were recoded in 
order to facilitate the specific type of research conducted.  Weapon type was recoded into 
two categories; high- and low-tech weapons.  The high-tech category included Nuclear, 
Biological, Chemical, and Radiological weapons, while the low-tech category included 
melee, incendiary, conventional firearms, and conventional explosives.  I also recoded 
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the low-tech weapons into an ordinal scale based on the level of technology used in each 
one.  The ranking was, from highest to lowest; explosives, firearms, incendiaries, melee.  
The reason other higher-tech forms were excluded from the variable were issues with the 
P-value in the regression equation.  Even though there were almost one hundred cases of 
nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attacks, when compared to the total 98,000 
cases, those hundred cases were not statistically significant.  For this reason, an ordinal 
ranking of technological level could only include weapon types in which there were 
enough cases in the database.   
     I chose casualties as the proxy by which I measure my dependent variable of threat.  I 
did this because it shows the actual number of people killed, rather than the potential, 
which I believe is responsible for the skewing of the technocentric threat system currently 
in place in the US.  This quantitative section was included to help operationalize threat by 
showing the actual destruction caused in various from of attack.  Terrorist attacks were 
used because actual conventional threats to the US have been virtually non-existent since 
the end of the Cold War.  US military hegemony has insured an asymmetrical battlefield 
that forces belligerents to assume irregular and non-conventional tactics, such as 
terrorism, in any effort to combat that hegemony. 
Results 
     The mean for the casualties’ variable in all attacks was 2.32 per attack.  The median 
was zero, and the standard deviation was 8.4.  The range in the casualties’ variable was 
zero to 1,382.  The first three quartiles of the casualties’ variable were made up of zero 
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casualty attacks; all attacks which inflicted casualties occurred in the fourth (75%) 
quartile.  This is due to the large number of attacks in which no casualties were inflicted.   
                Next, the ordinal ranking of weapon sophistication was regressed with 
casualties.  This regression showed a coefficient of -.866, with a P-value of .000.   This 
strong negative correlation shows that as the technology level of the weapon used 
decreases, casualties inflicted by the weapon will increase.  All data output can be found 
in the appendix of the work.  An explanation of how these findings fit into the overall 
hypothesis will follow. 
     An attempt was made to regress high- and low-tech attacks with the goal of seeing 
which actually caused more casualties.  However, due to the high number of low-tech 
attacks compared to high-tech (98,000 cases of low-tech compared to just over 200 high-
tech) regression could not be used to interpret the data.  A difference of means test was 
then conducted to assess the difference in the number of casualties inflicted; this also was 
unsatisfactory as P values did not meet levels of acceptability.  Because of the high 
number of low-tech attacks present a near constant, statistical modeling cannot be used to 
interpret the data.  What is relevant however, are the mean casualties by different types of 
weapons, as well as their success.   
     As we can see from Table 3, the attacks which result in the highest casualties are 
melee, firearms, vehicle, and chemical.  Three out of the four weapon types used in these 
attacks fall into the category of low-tech attacks.   
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Table 3 
    Mean Casualties By Weapon Type 
  
  
Mean 
Casualties 
Std. 
Error 
(95% Conf. 
Interval) 
Biological 2.04 1.6 -1.2 5.2 
Chemical 3.1 1.4 0.29 5.9 
Radiological 0 0 . . 
Nuclear 0 0 . . 
Firearms 3.4 0.06 3.3 3.6 
Explosives 1.6 0.03 1.5 1.7 
Fake 
Weapons 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.05 
Incendiary 0.38 0.07 0.24 0.53 
Melee 5.2 1 3.3 7.2 
Vehicle  3.2 1.7 -0.15 6.5 
Sabotage 0.64 0.33 -0.005 1.2 
Other 0.72 0.22 0.28 1.17 
Unknown 2.5 0.14 2.2 2.8 
 
     In Table 4, we can see the success each form of attack has had historically.  The most 
successful attacks (all over 90%) are sabotage, melee, incendiary, and firearms.   
Table 4 
    Mean Success By Weapon Type 
     Mean Success Std. Error (95% Conf. Interval) 
Biological 0.72 0.09 0.54 0.89 
Chemical 0.66 0.03 0.59 0.73 
Radiological 0.07 0.07 -0.06 0.21 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 
Firearms 0.95 0 0.94 0.95 
Explosives 0.89 0 0.89 0.9 
Fake Weapons 0.3 0.06 0.18 0.43 
Incendiary 0.93 0 0.93 0.94 
Melee 0.9 0 0.89 0.91 
Vehicle  0.87 0.04 0.77 0.96 
Sabotage 0.94 0.02 0.9 0.99 
Other 0.93 0.03 0.86 0.99 
Unknown 0.93 0.002 0.93 0.94 
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Findings 
     What these results show us is that low-tech weapons used in terror attacks are in fact 
deadlier than high-tech.  This is due partly to difficulty of non-state actors in pursuing 
and successfully using high-tech weapons in terrorist attacks.  It is also a sign of the 
efficacy of low-tech attacks, and the difficulty in preventing them.  A common factor in 
low-tech weapons, in fact the very definition itself, is that they do not require the sort of 
knowledge or funding to build that higher-tech weapons do.  In addition, they require 
little to no specialized training to operate.  This makes them widely available to large 
number of potential belligerents.  Finally, they often consist of items that are widely 
available and common, making them difficult to screen for.   
     Considering that the last conventional invasion of the US took place in 1812, and the 
last conventional attack on US soil occurred in World War II, why is it that the US 
continues to prioritize high-tech threats when structuring its defense budget?  The first 
and most obvious reason is that current budget policy that has prevented conventional 
invasions from occurring.  As there is no alternate universe to act as control a control, one 
can only guess.  However, we can see that as US military power has improved, invasions 
of the US have decreased, so it is reasonable to assume that current defense policy does 
in fact prevent invasion.  The issue then becomes what sort of additional alternative 
threats the US faces as conventional threats become less likely.  This is the reason that 
high- and low- tech threats have been examined in terror attacks only.  The work does not 
attempt to argue that high-tech weapons systems are anything other than extremely 
effective in conventional warfare.  However, in acts of terror technological sophistication 
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is not the primary factor in determining success, especially considering that success is 
measured differently than in conventional wars.  This brings one to the next logical 
question: Which threats should the US be addressing? 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
      The final chapter of this work consists of possible fixes to the stagnant and dated 
conceptualizations in US security.  This is not a new idea, and not one that I can take credit 
for.  The UN, as early as 1990, sought to ease the suffering and strife in the world by 
elevating the status of the people in it.  The idea behind this was that by erasing or easing the 
causes of conflict, the world might hope for a future free of conflict.   
     Anne-Marie Slaughter does an excellent job of summarizing a lengthy 2005 UN panel, 
and highlights the important topics of that panel.  What the panel proposed was an idea of 
collective security, that all the people and nations of the world would band together to create 
a regime of peace and prosperity.  The panel called for a “reconception of security, 
solidarity…and sovereignty” (619).  This reconception would distance policy makers from 
traditional paradigms of security, solidarity, and sovereignty by asking member states to 
work towards a common goal, focused on the individuals of the world.  Security would no 
longer be a matter of simply propagating a regime or enforcing territorial boundaries, but 
ensuring the security of people all over the world.  This would be done through solidarity of 
not just citizens in a nation, but through members of an international community, working 
together to ensure mutual peace.  Sovereignty will no longer be seen as a right of states, but a 
responsibility.  States will be held accountable for the well-being of their citizens, and the 
world community will ensure their cooperation through peaceful yet forceful measures.  This 
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would increase not just the security of the poor and peripheral, but of the rich and 
developed as well. 
     Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens work shows us that there is a correlation between 
human rights abuse and the rise of terrorism.  These authors’ work, while a case study of 
Ireland, could be applied to the world as a whole.  By ensuring the basic human rights of 
individuals around the globe, the international community would disincline future 
generations from turning to terrorism. One could also make use of Azzam and Thelen’s 
findings as to the effect of intervention and aid in the growth terror.  The two practices in 
tandem could prevent current terrorist organizations from gaining the support of the 
populace, which is integral to their propagation and success.  This is especially important 
to the US.  
     As the wealthiest nation in the world and a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council, the US is in the best position to ensure that these measures are adopted by the 
West.  Furthermore, through a restructuring of its own foreign policy, it could set an 
example of peaceful cooperation and support that would set the example for other 
regional powers.  Realist critics of these ideas state that relative gains and concerns on 
cheating collective action limit the likelihood of cooperation in an anarchic system (69).  
Yet, as Alexander Wendt states, anarchy is what states make of it.  Wendt states that “It is 
collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions” (74).  In 
other words, the anarchic nature of the international system is a product of collective 
actions, and if anarchy can be produced, then why not cooperation?  Humankind is the 
creator of the system, not its slave; what is required is a leader to step forward and set the 
example, to show the world that it can rise above the petty personal concerns of states 
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and achieve something more.  This will also help to encourage the cosmopolitan 
approach endorsed by Mary Kaldor.  A united front of effort from the nations of the 
world to promote human security around the world would cause terrorism to whither on 
the vine.  Without the large populations of disaffected citizens from which to recruit 
from, organizations like Al-Qaeda would find themselves becoming less and less 
relevant.  This is a direct contradiction to the alternative approach advocated by the 
Revolution in Military Affairs camp, which advocates an increasingly militant and 
technologically oriented approach to security.  While the RMA is correct in confronting 
the outdated methods of security in use, their solution is to embed themselves even more 
firmly in the very source of that outdated method.   
      This idea of human security is crucial to any discussion of threat and security today, 
and one in which the US is sadly lagging.  A state-centric view of security leaves the 
people of the US open to attacks like those of 9/11.  The attacks of 9/11 themselves are a 
sign of the plodding evolution of US threat perception; after all, terrorism targets 
individuals for a reason.  Any defeat of the US military in the past half century has 
occurred not because of any defeat of US forces, but because of a defeat of US support at 
home.  Al- Qaeda’s targets where well chosen, and show that they know the value of 
human security, or the lack of it.  For the US to continue its policies abroad, it must 
acknowledge the flaw in its threat perception; the US can only continue to project power 
if it maintains support for its polices at home, support that can be eroded by bringing the 
war to US citizens through terrorism.  Supporting an overseas conflict is much easier for 
voters when nameless camouflaged US soldiers are dying in a country they have never 
35 
 
heard of, compared to the sons and daughters, fathers and mothers who were killed just 
going to work on a September morning in 2011.   
     Terrorism is the greatest threat to US foreign policy, and the deadliest form of terror 
today comes in the form of low-tech weapons like the box cutters used in 9/11.  It is 
imperative that the US adjusts to this threat, and acknowledges the efficacy of such forms 
of attack.  While this work only touches the surface of an extremely complex subject, it 
should at the very least prove the need for more research into what is undoubtedly a 
crucial issue in 21st century US policy.   
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APPENDIX 
Regression of Casualties and Success with predicted values for 
unsuccessful attacks and successful attacks 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   
92074 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1, 92072) =  
452.29 
       Model |  32356.6317     1  32356.6317           Prob > F      =  
0.0000 
    Residual |  6586731.85 92072  71.5389244           R-squared     =  
0.0049 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  
0.0049 
       Total |  6619088.48 92073  71.8895711           Root MSE      =  
8.4581 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
------- 
       nkill |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------
------- 
    success1 |   2.115552   .0994748    21.27   0.000     1.920582    
2.310521 
       _cons |   .3932229   .0951065     4.13   0.000     .2068151    
.5796308 
 
Predicted y:        .39322   [ .20682,    .57963] 
Predicted y:        2.5088   [ 2.4516,    2.5659] 
 
 
Regression of casualties and success with predicted values unsuccessful 
and successful low tech attacks 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   
80937 
40 
 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1, 80935) =  
368.69 
       Model |  25108.1922     1  25108.1922           Prob > F      =  
0.0000 
    Residual |  5511740.02 80935  68.1008219           R-squared     =  
0.0045 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  
0.0045 
       Total |  5536848.21 80936  68.4102033           Root MSE      =  
8.2523 
 
       nkill |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------
------- 
    success1 |    1.92884   .1004534    19.20   0.000     1.731952    
2.125728 
       _cons |   .3797605    .095731     3.97   0.000     .1921284    
.5673926 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
------- 
 
regress: Predictions for nkill number of fatalities in unsuccessful 
attack with lowtech weapons 
                                95% Conf. Interval 
  Predicted y:        .37976   [ .19213,    .56739] 
. prvalue, x(success1=1)number of fatalities in successful attack if 
using lowtech weapons 
regress: Predictions for nkill 
                                95% Conf. Interval 
  Predicted y:        2.3086   [ 2.2489,    2.3683] 
Regression of casualties and success with predicted values for 
unsuccessful and successful high-tech attacks 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      
91 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    89) =    
3.34 
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       Model |  46.9468659     1  46.9468659           Prob > F      =  
0.0708 
    Residual |  1249.73445    89  14.0419601           R-squared     =  
0.0362 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  
0.0254 
       Total |  1296.68132    90  14.4075702           Root MSE      =  
3.7473 
 
       nkill |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------
------- 
    success1 |   1.629975   .8914388     1.83   0.071    -.1412948    
3.401245 
       _cons |   .0416667   .7649063     0.05   0.957    -1.478186    
1.561519 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
------- 
regress: Predictions for nkill number of fatalities in unsuccessful 
attack if hightech weapons are used 
                                95% Conf. Interval 
  Predicted y:        .04167   [-1.4575,    1.5409] 
. prvalue, x(success1=1)number of fatalities in successful attack using 
hightech weapons 
regress: Predictions for nkill 
 
                                95% Conf. Interval 
  Predicted y:        1.6716   [ .77437,    2.5689] 
Summary statistics for the casualties varibale 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       nkill |     92076    2.327002    8.478687          0       1180 
Regression of success and high-tech weapons 
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      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   
86256 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1, 86254) =   
33.90 
       Model |  2.70717455     1  2.70717455           Prob > F      =  
0.0000 
    Residual |  6887.26518 86254  .079848647           R-squared     =  
0.0004 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  
0.0004 
       Total |  6889.97235 86255  .079879107           Root MSE      =  
.28258 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
------- 
    success1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------
------- 
    hightech |  -.1707068   .0293175    -5.82   0.000    -.2281688   -
.1132448 
       _cons |   .9126423   .0009627   948.04   0.000     .9107555    
.9145291 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
------- 
 
Regression of success with low-tech attacks 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   
86256 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1, 86254) =   
33.90 
       Model |  2.70717455     1  2.70717455           Prob > F      =  
0.0000 
    Residual |  6887.26518 86254  .079848647           R-squared     =  
0.0004 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  
0.0004 
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       Total |  6889.97235 86255  .079879107           Root MSE      =  
.28258 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
------- 
    success1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------
------- 
     lowtech |   .1707068   .0293175     5.82   0.000     .1132448    
.2281688 
       _cons |   .7419355   .0293017    25.32   0.000     .6845045    
.7993665 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
------- 
Regression of Casualties and the ordinal technological ranking of 
weapons used. 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   
81356 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1, 81354) =  
519.70 
       Model |  35104.5736     1  35104.5736           Prob > F      =  
0.0000 
    Residual |  5495277.11 81354  67.5477188           R-squared     =  
0.0063 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  
0.0063 
       Total |  5530381.69 81355  67.9783871           Root MSE      =  
8.2187 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
------- 
       nkill |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------
------- 
      wepord |  -.8669574   .0380296   -22.80   0.000    -.9414951   -
.7924197 
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       _cons |   4.956142   .1274946    38.87   0.000     4.706254    
5.206031 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
------- 
   Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   
86579 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1, 86577) =  
384.93 
       Model |  30.3514806     1  30.3514806           Prob > F      =  
0.0000 
    Residual |  6826.56611 86577   .07884965           R-squared     =  
0.0044 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  
0.0044 
       Total |  6856.91759 86578  .079199307           Root MSE      =   
.2808 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
------- 
    success1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------
------- 
      wepord |  -.0248092   .0012645   -19.62   0.000    -.0272876   -
.0223307 
       _cons |   .9945741   .0042519   233.91   0.000     .9862404    
1.002908 
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